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PUTTING OLMSTEAD TO WORK:
TOWARD A LESS SEGREGATED
WORKPLACE
Alexander Lane†
Today, across the United States of America, hundreds of
thousands of people with disabilities are being isolated and
financially exploited by their employers. Many are segregated
away from traditional work and kept out of sight . . . .For many
people with disabilities, their dream of leaving their ‘job
training program’ will never come true. They labor away
making only a tiny portion of what they should because there is
a system in place that provides no true alternatives.
– Curtis L. Decker, Esq., Executive Director of the National
Disability Rights Network 1

I.

Introduction

At the Harold V. Birch Vocational Academy, “a Providence
high school where students with intellectual disabilities
participated in an in-school sheltered workshop, separated from
their non-disabled peers,” Jerry D’Agostino worked to sort,
assemble, and package jewelry and buttons.2 At the Academy, Jerry
earned well below minimum wage until graduating in 2010.3
Thereafter, Jerry continued to perform this “benchwork” at another
sheltered workshop—Goodwill Industries.4 Jerry felt this work was

†. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2019; B.A., Western
Washington University, 2016. Alexander would like to thank the staff and editors of
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, in particular Alicia Granse, for
their help in preparing this Article for publication. Alexander would also like to
thank his family for their constant support and encouragement.
1. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SEGREGATED AND EXPLOITED: THE
FAILURE OF THE DISABILITY SERVICE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE QUALITY WORK 3 (2011),
https://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/Publications/Reports/Segregate
d-and-Exploited.pdf.
2. Faces of Olmstead, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/faces_of
_olmstead.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (containing a collection of personal stories
of persons with disabilities following the June 2013 Interim Settlement Agreement
between the Department of Justice and the State of Rhode Island and the City of
Providence.) (“Under the agreement individuals will receive access to integrated
supported employment and integrated day activity services, allowing them to become
more active participants in the community.”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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boring and lamented the amount of downtime involved.5 Prior to the
June 2013 Interim Settlement Agreement between the Department
of Justice and the State of Rhode Island and City of Providence,
Jerry believed spending his days in a sheltered workshop
performing rote benchwork for less than minimum wage would be
a life sentence.6
Jerry’s story is not uncommon in the United States. According
to a 2011 report by the National Disability Rights Network (NDRN),
“[e]ven with the dramatic improvements in competitive
employment, there remains three individuals in segregated day
programs for every one person working in competitive
employment.”7 In 2012, Goodwill Industries—Jerry’s postgraduation sheltered workshop employer—reported employing
more than 260,000 individuals with disabilities.8 The wisdom and
legality of sheltered workplaces have increasingly been called into
question. In response, this Note proposes the Department of Justice
promulgate regulations to clarify if and when sheltered workshops
are legal under Section II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA). Comprehensive regulations offer a better opportunity
to clarify the policies underlying the act than does litigation.
With the 1990 passage of the ADA, Congress intended “to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”9
In the 1999 decision, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the United
States Supreme Court held that the ADA stood for the proposition
that people with disabilities have a right to live in a broader
community alongside their non-disabled peers.10 However,
Olmstead only prohibited the residential segregation of people with
disabilities in residential institutions—not vocational segregation.11
5. Id.
6. Id. (“I thought I would be doing benchwork my whole life.”).
7. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 1, at 9.
8. Laura Walling, Goodwill Helps People with Disabilities Reach Their Full
Potential, GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INT’L, INC., http://www.goodwill.org/blog/advocate/
goodwill-helps-people-with-disabilities-reach-their-full-potential/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2018). Goodwill Industries “does not support the phase out or elimination of the
Special Wage Certificate,” a certificate from the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor that allows employers to pay workers with disabilities less than
the federal minimum wage under Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 214(c). Id.
9. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. 1 (2011), https://www.ada
.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.pdf (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
10. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999).
11. See id.
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With regard to the segregative nature of sheltered workshops, the
NDRN, a nonprofit organization seeking federal support for
advocacy on behalf of people with disabilities, has argued that: 1)
segregated work and sheltered environments contradict national
policy; 2) work segregation of people with disabilities is damaging;
and 3) sheltered workshops lead nowhere.12 This Note argues the
Department of Justice should promulgate regulations clarifying the
appropriate application, if any, of such sheltered workshops—in
particular, the Department of Justice should follow the lead of the
Department of Education in promulgating regulations to the effect
that persons with disabilities should be situated in the least
restrictive environment appropriate to that person within the
workplace.
Though sheltered workshops have existed in the United States
since at least 1840, their popularity exploded in the 1950s and
1960s.13 Segregated workshops are “facility-based day programs
attended by adults with disabilities as an alternative to working in
the open labor market.”14 These workshops were designed to
“enable men with severe physical impairments to contribute to
society.”15 Sheltered workshops have drawn increasing scrutiny
since the 2011 publication of the NDRN’s Segregated & Exploited:
The Failure of the Disability Service System to Provide Quality
Work.16 A number of persons with disabilities in Oregon have
challenged sheltered workshops as violating Title II of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).17 However, no such case has yet been
decided on the merits—leaving the question open as to whether in
fact such workshops do violate these provisions of federal law. In
order to clear up this uncertainty, and to protect workers with
12. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 1, at 15–27, 32–34.
13. Laura C. Hoffman, An Employment Opportunity or a Discrimination
Dilemma?: Sheltered Workshops and the Employment of the Disabled, 16 U. PA. J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 151, 154 (2013).
14. Id. at 151.
15. Gena Rinaldi, Gimme Shelter?: Lane v. Kitzhaber and Its Impact on
Integrated Employment Services for People with Disabilities, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 751 (2014).
16. See, e.g., id. (discussing the NDRN report that demonstrated hundreds of
thousands of people remain segregated in sheltered workshops); Hoffman, supra
note 13, at 151–52 (stating that the NDRN report brought greater attention to this
issue).
17. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Or. 2012) (involving a
class action filed by eight individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities
alleging that the Oregon Department of Human Services violated Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 by unnecessarily keeping them segregated in sheltered workshops).
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disabilities and employers alike, the Department of Justice should
promulgate regulations that ensure: 1) workers with disabilities are
not segregated from their non-disabled peers in the workplace
where such segregation places these workers in a more restrictive
environment than necessary; and 2) where segregated workshops
are indeed in the best interest of workers with disabilities, their use
is regulated to protect these workers.
To that end, Part I of this Note discusses the history of
segregation in the United States that led to the landmark
Olmstead18 decision. Part II provides an overview of Title II of the
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and relevant
precedent. Part III discusses the analogous case of the
desegregation of educational settings along the axis of disability.
Finally, Part IV discusses and recommends possible courses of
action that the Department of Justice could pursue in promulgating
regulations to adequately oversee the use of sheltered workshops.
The continuing debates surrounding the benefits and detriments to
relying on sheltered workshops, combined with the sporadic
implementation of supported services approaches, creates an
opportunity for guidance at the federal level through the
Department of Justice’s promulgation of regulations that would
instruct the states on the appropriate use and appearance of
sheltered workshops.
II. Background
Sheltered workshops are “characterized by repetitive
piecework, which has been subcontracted to the sheltered
workshops by companies that never interact with the disabled
employees performing the work.”19 This is at odds with the spirit
and perhaps the letter of acts promoting community integration for
persons with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act of 197320
“promoted the idea of community integration . . . identif[ying] one
of its purposes as ‘promot[ing] and expand[ing] employment
opportunities in the public and private sectors for handicapped
individuals and to place such individuals in employment.”21

18. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581.
19. Susan Stefan, Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of Olmstead
to Segregated Employment Settings, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 895 (2010) (citing
ZANA MARIE LUTFIYYA, PAT ROGAN, & BONNIE SHOULTZ, CTR. ON HUMAN POLICY,
SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW (1988), http://thechp.syr.edu/c
hp-archives-supported-employment-a-conceptual-overview/).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2012).
21. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 1, at 15.
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However, a far greater level of protection for people with disabilities
came in 1990 when Congress passed the ADA.22 The stated purpose
of the ADA was:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf
of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.23

However, with regard to sheltered workshops, the “national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities” has been anything but “clear and
comprehensive.”24 The provision of the ADA at issue in Olmstead25
and here, found in Title II, reads: “Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”26 This provision,
which clearly establishes that individuals with disabilities cannot
be excluded from appropriate activities, does not directly address
the creation of programs specifically for those with disabilities.
The first case dealing with discrimination against people with
disabilities preceded even the passage of the ADA—Homeward
Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Medical Center.27 Homeward Bound “created
principles and remedies that remain as alive and true today as they
were over twenty years ago.”28 There, the court found that “all

22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-33, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
24. Id.
25. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). The definition of a “qualified individual with a
disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. at § 12131(2).
27. Stefan, supra note 19, at 883 (citing Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom
Medical Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987)).
28. Stefan, supra note 19, at 883.

6

Sua Sponte

[Spring: 1

Hissom class members are to receive prevocational and vocational
services commensurate with his/her need. This will necessitate that
the State accelerate and perhaps redirect its efforts to create
employment options for persons with severe disabilities.”29
Following the passage of the ADA, in Olmstead,30 the Supreme
Court interpreted this portion of the ADA to “require[] the removal
of individuals with disabilities from institutional settings and into
communities whenever possible.”31 Under Title II of the ADA, the
Attorney General “shall promulgate regulations in an accessible
format that implement [Title II, including 42 U.S.C. § 12132’s
discrimination proscription].”32 One such regulation, the
“integration regulation,” provides that: “A public entity shall
administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities.”33 Another such regulation, the “reasonablemodifications regulation,” provides: “A public entity shall make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when
the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis
of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making
the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service, program, or activity.”34 In Olmstead, Justice Ginsburg, for
the majority, found that the remedies appropriate for a violation
falling under Title II of the ADA are those made available by section
505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.35 The Court held that, under
these regulations, “[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly regarded
as discrimination based on disability.”36 However, it also recognized
that States need to maintain “a range of facilities for the care and
treatment of persons with diverse mental disabilities, and the
State’s obligation to administer services with an even hand.”37 This
recognition of the segregation of persons with disabilities in housing
as a form of discrimination based on disability flows directly from

29. Homeward Bound, WL 27104 at *38.
30. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 581.
31. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 156.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2012).
33. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998).
34. Id. at § 35.130(b)(7).
35. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 590 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133) (“The remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 505 of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the
remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.”).
36. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.
37. Id.
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the language of Title II of the ADA.38 In prohibiting this form of
segregative discrimination, Justice Ginsburg did not go so far as to
apply this logic to segregation found in the workplace.
Following Olmstead, however, plaintiffs with disabilities have
filed multiple lawsuits to apply the logic of Olmstead to similar
segregation in the workplace—especially in so-called “sheltered
workshops.”39 In Lane v. Kitzhaber,40 eight individuals with
intellectual or developmental disabilities who received employment
services from the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS)
brought a class action against DHS and various state officials,
including Oregon’s governor, the Director of DHS, and the
Administrator of the Office of Developmental Disability Services,
alleging violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.41 Seven of the
eight plaintiffs worked in sheltered workshops—“segregated
employment settings that employ people with disabilities or where
people with disabilities work separately from others”—and would
have preferred to receive supported employment services “which
would prepare and allow them to work in an integrated employment
setting, which they define as a real job in a community-based
business setting, where employees have an opportunity to work
alongside non-disabled coworkers and earn at least minimum
wage.”42 The court found that the case fell under the purview of the
ADA because it involved “the state’s provision (or failure to provide)
integrated employment services, including supported employment
programs.”43 Therefore, the court denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.44 The case settled soon thereafter, leaving the question of
whether the law permitted sheltered workshops in any
circumstances unanswered.
However, others have suggested some benefits to sheltered
workshops. For example, “they are safer alternatives to outside
employment, they are less demanding for people with disabilities in
terms of work and social skills, they provide greater opportunities

38. Id. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”). See also 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(5) (2012) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination, including . . . segregation . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (2012).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1199.
42. Id. at 1201.
43. Id. at 1202.
44. Id. at 1208.
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for fostering friendships, they ensure structure during the
weekdays, and they ensure assistance for life without affecting
disability benefits.”45 While some states have largely moved toward
supported employment services, others continue to rely primarily
on sheltered workshops.46
Opposition to the phasing out of sheltered workshops on the
basis that they provide needed services for some individuals with
disabilities misses the mark. In Olmstead itself, Justice Ginsburg
found that “[t]he ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to
phase out institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk,”
and that it is not “the ADA’s mission to drive States to move
institutionalized patients into an inappropriate setting, such as a
homeless shelter.”47 Here, the situation of sheltered workshops is
analogous—the ADA should not be read to require an abolition of
all placements in sheltered workshops, but rather to prohibit the
over-utilization of such workshops where less restrictive settings
are available and appropriate given the needs of the individual in
question. This accords with the findings of the district court in Lane
v. Kitzhaber,48 and with the logic of Olmstead in prohibiting the
segregation of persons with disabilities except where such
segregation is appropriate, as determined on an individualized
basis.
The Department of Justice has already begun trying its hand
at applying Olmstead to the issue of sheltered workshops and
whether such practices bring states out of compliance with Title II
of the ADA. In 2012, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the
Attorney General of Oregon, stating that:
Title II of the ADA and Olmstead mandate that individuals be
given the opportunity to be integrated into the community more
than just by their mere transition into integrated residential
settings. Rather, individuals with disabilities have the right to
live integrated lives, by participating in all aspects of
community life . . . .[T]housands of individuals still spend the
majority of their day-time hours receiving employment services
in segregated sheltered workshops, even though they are

45. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 164 (citing Alberto Migliore, Sheltered
Workshops,
INT’L
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
REHABILITATION
(2010),
http://sphhp.buffalo.edu/rehabilitation-science/research-and-facilities/fundedresearch-archive/center-for-international-rehab-research-info-exchange.html.
46. Stefan, supra note 19, at 930–31 (finding that New Mexico, Vermont, and
Washington largely rely on supported employment services, while Idaho, Missouri,
and Nevada continue to rely primarily on sheltered workshops).
47. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–05.
48. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1204(“[P]articipation for persons with disabilities in
sheltered workshops ‘must be a choice, not a requirement.’”).
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capable of, and want to receive employment services in the
community. Such unjustified segregation makes many of the
benefits of community life elusive for people with disabilities,
even though they are residing in the community.49

The letter goes on to argue that “[w]ork is undoubtedly at the
core of how most Americans spend their time, contribute as
taxpayers, relate to society, and, importantly, access the full
benefits of citizenship, including economic self-sufficiency,
independence, personal growth, and self-esteem.”50
Finally, in 2011, the Department of Justice interpreted the
integration mandate “to include the corpus of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Olmstead, by specifically including integrated
employment services as a remedy to unnecessary segregation in
sheltered workshops.”51 This, in combination with the Letter to the
Attorney General of Oregon, marks a shift in the stance of the
Department of Justice on the legal status of sheltered workshops,
integrated employment, and the integration mandate. However,
because much remains unclear in the application of this mandate—
even given the recent trend of the U.S. Department of Justice
toward encouraging integration—much is left to be desired in terms
of federal guidance on this issue. The shortcomings of Department
of Justice policy, and suggested alternatives, are discussed in Part
III of this Note, following a brief discussion of the analogous
situation of the “Least Restrictive Environment” doctrine arising
from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),52 and
a discussion on Minnesota’s “Olmstead Plan” as an example of a
direction the Department of Justice could take.
III. The “Least Restrictive Environment” Doctrine in the
Educational Sphere
Residential segregation is not the only sphere in which
Congress and the courts have grappled with the relative autonomy
of individuals with disabilities. Such debates have also been fought
out in the context of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and

49. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
John Kroger, Att’y Gen., State of Or. 2 (June 29, 2012), http://www.ada.gov/olmstea
d/documents/oregon_findings_letter.pdf (emphasis added).
50. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 174 (quoting Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra
note 49, at 3).
51. Rinaldi, supra note 15, at 755 (citing CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 9.
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2010).
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Bill of Rights Act of 197553 and the 2004 IDEA.54 As far back as
1975, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act centered the discussion of the individual autonomy of persons
with disabilities around the concept of “restriction.” In section
6010(2), Congress stated that “[t]he treatment, services, and
habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . should
be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s
personal liberty.”55 However, this “least restrictive” requirement
was not mandatory.56 In fact, the Supreme Court held that this
“least restrictive” language “when read in the context of other more
specific provisions of the Act, does no more than express a
congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment,” concluding
that this statute did not create any new substantive rights in favor
of persons with disabilities.57 In 2004, Congress would finally make
this “least restrictive” language mandatory under the IDEA.58
However, as discussed in Part II of this Note, this language still
remains unclear when it comes to issues of workplace segregation.
In comparison, in Olmstead the Supreme Court held that the
ADA’s proscription of discrimination requires the placement of
persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather
than in institutions when the State’s treatment professionals
have determined that community placement is appropriate, the
transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is
not opposed by the affected individual, and the placement can
be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities.59

This marks a clear line of concern by the courts in preserving
the liberty of individuals with disabilities from the educational
sphere to the residential. The Department of Justice’s signaling of
an interest in the overuse of “sheltered workshops” marks a foray
into a third sphere—the occupational.

53. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. 106-402, Title IV, § 401(a),
Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1737.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2010).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976).
56. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 599 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (concluding that the § 6010 provisions “were
intended to be hortatory, not mandatory.”)).
57. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19–20.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3) (stating that the Secretary shall monitor the states in
adequately measuring performance in the “[p]rovision of a free appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment”) (emphasis added).
59. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
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The IDEA “provides federal funds to assist state and local
agencies to educate disabled children,” with eligibility for such
funding conditioned on compliance with the Act.60 Under the Act,
the segregation of children with disabilities into special education
classes is appropriate only where the child’s disability is so severe
as to “prevent[] her from being educated satisfactorily in a regular
education classroom.”61 Under section 1412(a)(5) of the IDEA, this
requirement that children with disabilities be provided with a free
appropriate public education in the “least restrictive environment”
is known as “mainstreaming.”62 Under this requirement, “school
districts must teach disabled children and able-bodied children
together to the maximum extent possible.”63
In passing the IDEA, Congress found that:
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no
way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or
contribute to society. Improving educational results for children
with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy
of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
individuals with disabilities.64

Here, Congress establishes the IDEA as aimed toward, in part,
the economic self-sufficiency of individuals with disabilities.
Furthermore, improving educational results of those persons is
portrayed as only one element for achieving this goal. To that end,
one requirement imposed by the IDEA is the “least restrictive
environment”:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities,
including children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children
with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.65

This focus on restriction as a marker of the inclusivity of
educational settings provides a lens through which the Department

60. Brian L. Porto, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive
Environment Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq., 189 A.L.R. Fed. 297 (2003).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
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of Justice could examine and improve the lives of those disabled
persons working in “sheltered workshops.”
Limiting restrictions on individuals with disabilities can also
have positive impacts on individuals without disabilities. In an
evaluation of special education services in four elementary and four
secondary schools in a large, metropolitan school district in a
southwestern city, Dr. Lorna Idol found that teachers overall
strongly supported the practice of integrating special education
students into general education classes.66 In her study, Dr. Idol
defined an inclusive school as one where “all students are educated
in general education programs,” and defined inclusion as “when a
student with special learning and/or behavioral needs is educated
full time in the general education program. Essentially, inclusion
means that the student with special education needs is attending
the general school program, enrolled in age-appropriate classes
100% of the school day.”67 In contrast, “mainstreaming” is a process
by which “a student with special education needs is educated
partially in a special education program, but to the maximum
extent possible is educated in the general education program.”68 In
terms of educators’ attitudes towards inclusion, “there was a trend
among the participating educators of moving more and more toward
the inclusion of students with disabilities in the general education
classes,” and educators “had generally favorable impressions of the
impact of students with disabilities on other students in their
classes,” with the exception of exceptionally disruptive students’
behavioral problems.69
Under the IDEA, the educational placement of a child must
accord with the “least restrictive environment” requirement.70 In
the Ninth Circuit, whether a child’s placement complies with this
requirement is determined by balancing four factors: “(1) the
educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the
non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect the student
has on the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the cost
of mainstreaming the student.”71 Here, the Ninth Circuit’s
66. Lorna Idol, Toward Inclusion of Special Education Students in General
Education: A Program Evaluation of Eight Schools, 27 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC.,
no. 2, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 77.
67. Id. (citing Lorna Idol, Key Questions Related to Building Collaborative and
Inclusive Schools, 30 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES, no. 4, July–Aug. 1997, at 384).
68. Idol, Key Questions, supra note 67, at 384–85.
69. Idol, Toward Inclusion, supra note 66, at 91.
70. Susan C. Bon, Confronting the Special Education Inclusion Debate: A
Proposal to Adopt New State-Wide LRE Guidelines, 249 ED. L. REP. 1, 4 (2009).
71. Katherine G. ex. rel. Cynthia G. v. Kentfield Sch. Dist., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1159,
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balancing approach acknowledges the importance of both
educational and non-educational benefits of mainstreaming
students with disabilities, as well as the effect on non-disabled
persons and the economic impact of mainstreaming.
IV. Minnesota’s “Olmstead Plan”
Minnesota’s Olmstead Plan provides one example of a state
embracing the Department of Justice’s attempted expansion of
Olmstead to include the workplace. An Olmstead Plan is a “public
entity’s plan for implementing its obligation to provide individuals
with disabilities opportunities to live, work, and be served in
integrated settings.”72 The Olmstead Subcommittee of the
Minnesota Department of Human Services oversees Minnesota’s
Olmstead Plan, following the Olmstead mandate.73
The purpose of Minnesota’s plan is to “ensur[e] that people
with disabilities experience lives of inclusion and integration in the
community, just like the lives of people without disabilities,” and
the plan envisions a society “where people with disabilities have the
opportunity, both now and in the future, to live close to their
families and friends and as independently as possible, to work in
competitive, integrated employment, to be educated in integrated
settings, and to participate in community life.”74 This reflects an
acknowledgement of the inherent dignity of learning, living, and
working in the broader community, and reflects the aims of the
Department of Justice’s inclusion mandate.
This Olmstead Plan, however, was not based on pure idealism.
The State of Minnesota reached a settlement in a class action in the
U.S. District Court in Jensen v. DHS, resulting in the modification
of Minnesota’s Olmstead Plan.75 In Jensen, the court noted that an
Olmstead Plan “must contain concrete, reliable, and realistic
commitments, accompanied by specific and reasonable timetables,

1172 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v.
Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)).
72. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERV., PUTTING THE PROMISE OF OLMSTEAD INTO PRACTICE:
MINNESOTA’S OLMSTEAD PLAN 9 (Aug. 10, 2015 Rev.) (citing CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4; see also Caroline Strnad, What is the Olmstead
Plan and Why Should I Care?, MINN. ORG. ON FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME (Aug. 12,
2013), https://www.mofas.org/2013/08/what-is-the-olmstead-plan-and-why-should-icare (“An Olmstead Plan is the way for states to document its [sic] plan to provide
services for individuals with disabilities in the most inclusive, integrated setting
appropriate for the individual.”).
73. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERV., supra note 72.
74. Id.
75. Jensen v. Dep’t of Human Serv., No. 09-1775, at 2 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2014).
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for which the public agencies will be held accountable.”76 It further
noted that, to be effective, a Plan must “demonstrate success in
actually moving individuals to integrated settings in furtherance of
the goals.”77 However, this approach leaves much to be desired.
While a state-by-state litigation-focused approach, wherein the
Department of Justice seeks settlement with each individual state
to ensure compliance with its interpretation of the Olmstead
decision, is useful insofar as it accomplishes integration on a local
basis, a nation-wide regulation of sheltered workshops would
enshrine the position that persons with disabilities deserve to live
full lives in our society. This demonstrates a flaw in the use of
Olmstead Plans as cure-alls in the struggle to phase out sheltered
workshops—by shifting the struggle against segregation to
individual states in a piece-meal, courts-based solution, hundreds
of thousands of individuals with disabilities have been left behind.
Instead, this Note advocates a national approach through the
promulgation of regulations by the Department of Justice under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The particulars of this
recommendation are laid out in Part VI of this Note.
V. Policy Recommendations
The Department of Justice should look to the regulations
promulgated by the Department of Education relating to the IDEA’s
“least restrictive environment” requirement.78 By borrowing from
the Department of Education’s regulations concerning the least
restrictive environments, the Department of Justice can look to the
well-established case law on the issue.79 In fact, these regulations
dovetail nicely with already-existing Department of Justice
regulation 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d), which states that “[a] public entity
shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities.”80 When compared with the Department of
Education’s regulations concerning integrated educational

76. Id. at 5.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 (promulgating regulations by the Department
of Education regarding state eligibility for assistance for the education of children
with disabilities).
79. See, e.g., Tammy S. v. Reedsburg Sch. Dist., 302 F. Supp. 2d 959, 979 (W.D.
Wis. 2003) (“The least restrictive environment requirement ‘is relative and
concentrates on other placement options’ than the one proposed by a school district.”)
(quoting Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2002)).
80. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
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settings,81 it is clear that both agencies value the maximum possible
integration between disabled and non-disabled individuals in
various settings. However, in order to clarify the uncertain legality
of “sheltered workshops,” the Department of Justice should follow
the Department of Education in specifying that this integration
mandate applies to both public and private institutions with regard
to employment. By only applying this integration mandate to public
services, the Department of Justice has shifted the burden of
providing maximum possible integration onto plaintiffs, many of
whom may lack the bargaining power or means to challenge their
private employer.
Thus, the Department of Justice should promulgate the
following regulation, or something substantially similar:
To the maximum extent appropriate, individuals with
disabilities, including individuals in public or private
institutions, are employed in a setting with individuals who are
nondisabled; and separate environments, or other removal of
individuals with disabilities from the regular occupational
environment occurs only if the nature or severity of the
disability is such that employment in the broader work
environment cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

By making explicit that the Department of Justice’s inclusion
mandate applies to the private workforce, this regulation would
clarify the significant ambiguity in the law left in the wake of
Olmstead,82 as well as make the inclusion mandate consistent
between the occupational and educational spheres. Unlike the
IDEA, Title I of the ADA applies to private and public employers
alike.83
Finally, this approach accounts for critics’ contention that the
abolition of sheltered workshops would invariably lead to denying
persons with disabilities access to fitting working environments.
The Olmstead decision “is not about forcing integration upon
individuals who choose otherwise or who would not be appropriately
served in community settings.”84 Rather, a clarification of the

81. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2) (“Each public agency must ensure
that . . . [t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with
children who are nondisabled.”).
82. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5) (defining “covered entity” as an employer and
defining an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year.”); see also Facts About the Americans with
Disabilities Act, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-ada.cfm.
84. Jensen, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.
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legality of sheltered workshops—along with a concomitant increase
in scrutiny on the widespread use of them as a cure-all—would
ensure that sheltered workshop settings are used only for those
persons for whom a cloistered environment is appropriate. For the
time being, sheltered workshops are widely used. To clarify when
such environments are legal is not to deprive those persons who
truly need a sheltered environment an ability to work; instead, it is
merely to ensure that each individual is given the resources he or
she requires to live a full and dignified life.
Conclusion
In 1948, Professor Jacobus tenBroek, President of the National
Federation of the Blind, spoke at the Banquet of the Annual
Convention of the Federation. In that speech, Professor tenBroek,
himself blind, said:
A program of public assistance . . . must be so arranged as to
leave the recipient’s independence unimpaired. He must be free
to spend his grant as he pleases. He must be left to make his
own decisions about where and how he shall live and what he
shall do. He must have the divine election, so far as social
existence and his own talents permit, of making the choices
which determine his own worldly destinies, not without
guidance, if he wishes it, but without intrusion, if he does not.
Man does not forfeit the rights of individuality and the dignity
of the person by economic necessity or physical handicap; and
the injunction to be thy brother’s keeper is not an order to
become his master.85

His vision of a society in which persons with disabilities would
be free of the humiliation of servitude is within reach. By
promulgating regulations under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the Department of Justice could remove the stumbling block of
segregation from the lives of persons with disabilities. By ensuring
that all individuals are integrated into their respective workplaces
to the greatest extent possible, the Department of Justice could
bring us closer to Professor tenBroek’s dream, and closer to a more
just society.
Under the IDEA, students with intellectual disabilities are to
be served in the “least restrictive environment” appropriate.
Similarly, under Olmstead, persons with disabilities are to be
housed in the “most integrated setting appropriate to the needs” of
the individual in question.86 In the burgeoning debate over the
85. Jacobus tenBroek, President, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, A Bill of Rights for the
Blind (July 1948), https://nfb.org/Images/nfb/Publications/convent/banque48.html.
86. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602.
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legality, and propriety, of “sheltered workshops,” and the
accompanying legal ambiguity of those programs, the Department
of Justice should look to both the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Education and the Supreme Court’s mandates under
Olmstead. In doing so, the Department of Justice should
promulgate its own regulations under the ADA stating that
workplaces that hire persons with disabilities should place those
individuals in the least restrictive—or most integrated—setting
possible in the workplace. This would leave open the possibility for
the use of “sheltered” work environments for those individuals for
whom an integrated workplace would be infeasible, while also
cutting back on the widespread over-use of those workplace settings
so criticized by groups such as the National Disabilities Rights
Network. By fully integrating workers with disabilities into the
mainstream employment sphere where possible, this approach
would both reduce the stigma associated with disability in the
workplace as well as truly enshrine the “right to live in the world”
for persons with disabilities.87

87. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law
of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 918 (1966).

